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People are able to infer a sense of agency for their actions, i.e., the sense that
an action is self-generated. We hypothesize that a sense of agency also allows to
infer an early (motor coordination level) distinction of own from other’s actions
during non-verbal social interaction. To test this, we simulated the handwriting
of numerals using a computational model based on principles of active inference.
The model has no sense of another agent being present and it cannot see its own
hand and the pen it holds. It only sees what is written on a white canvas, and
has the ability to write. This is all the model knows about its world. Now when
it writes, all it can do to distinguish its own action from that of another agent, is
to recognize its own writing. This is especially tricky when another agent would
try to write at the same time. We have run several simulation scenarios and will
show the dynamics of the model’s behavior and judgements of sense of agency
[1].
We developed and implemented a generative model of the dynamic processes
underlying motor coordination and self-other distinction. It consists of a hier-
archy of predictive processes of increasingly abstract representations over vi-
suomotor primitives. These representations are also generative processes, which
together form a hierarchical generative model which maps from (hidden) causes
in the world to their perceived (sensory) consequences. The model relies on prin-
ciples of active inference and free energy minimization [2, 3]. The tight coupling
between action and perception in active inference means that, following predic-
tion errors, either the model hypotheses have to be updated or action in the
world is necessary to make future sensory evidence meet the model predictions.
Free energy is merely the term for the negative log model evidence of a per-
ceived event given the model prediction, i.e., the prediction error which is to be
minimized.
The hierarchical model makes use of spatial and temporal aspects of action,
and integrates predictive and postdictive cues for sense of agency over time. To
be more specific, what allows the model to infer that it is writing a number
itself, is not only the prediction of the actual stroke it intended to write, as in
the comparator model [4]. In addition, the time it took from an intention to act
until its perceived consequence needs to be within the predicted bounds of its
embodiment [5, 6]. That is, it can predict not only how its body needs to act,
but also how long it takes to act. This, along with a fluency effect and higher
level intentions to act, allow the model to attribute a sense of agency to own
actions.
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We simulated and compared different scenarios of perception and produc-
tion of handwritten numerals to showcase the belief dynamics, and how active
inference works to minimize free energy on the different levels of the model’s
hierarchy. In addition, we show how temporal and spatial prediction-errors in-
crease free energy, decrease precision, and influence the integration of sense of
agency over time.
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